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There is a growing interest in the impact of foreign banking on the financial 
system and the economic development of emerging and transition countries 
(Claessens, Demirgűç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001; Iakova and Wagner 2001; 
Mathieson and Roldos 2001). The upcoming eastward enlargement of the 
European Union has only increased this interest. During the past decade, 
many former communist countries have made substantial progress in the 
transition from a centrally planned economy to a market based economy. In 
recent years, progress has been particularly significant in restructuring and 
consolidating the banking sector. This has mainly been accomplished 
through the privatization of state-owned banks and the opening-up of the 
banking sector to foreign ownership.  
This paper analyzes the development of the banking sector during 
the transition process in the Central and Eastern European countries. We 
particularly focus on the position of foreign-owned banks, as it turns out 
that they play an important role in the development of the financial system 
of European transition countries: more than half of the banks in the region 
are foreign-owned, accounting for two thirds of total bank assets. We have 
gathered new data about several aspects of the development, structure, 
conduct and performance of the banking sector in the region. As such, this 
paper is one of the first to analyze the complete region on the basis of an 
identical methodology for all countries.
1  
Our analysis is based on a number of key indicators, summarized in 
Appendix 1. We use definitions in line with those proposed by Beck,   
Demirgűç-Kunt and Levine (1999). We define a bank to be foreign in case 
 
1 Up to now, most studies focused on a limited number of countries within the region. For example, 
Dobosiewicz (1995), Mervart (1996), Sabi (1996), Buch (1997), Steinherr (1997), Bonin, Mizsei, 
Székely and Wachtel (1998), Bonin and Abel (2000), Galac and Kraft (2000), Hasan and Marton (2000), 
Scholtens (2000), Storf (2000), Barisitz (2001), Schardax and Reiniger (2001). For a comprehensive 
overview of the financial sector in transition countries in 2001, see ECB (2002). 
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more than 50 percent of its shares are owned by foreigners. Of course, 
banks from outside the country may have a minority share so that focusing 
on the number of banks owned by foreign banks may underestimate foreign 
influence. Therefore, we also take in consideration the development of 
foreign-owned bank assets.  
A problem in analyzing the transition process is the lack of reliable 
data. Therefore, we have sought the co-operation of central banks in the 
region. Several central banks helped us to gather aggregated data required 
to analyze the development of the banking sector and the role of foreign 
banks. This information was supplemented with data from the IMF's 
International Financial Statistics and data from the EBRD. However, for a 
good understanding of the banking sector in the transition economies, 
adequate knowledge of the operations of individual banks is essential. Data 
on individual banks were therefore gathered using the BankScope database.  
Our main findings are that the speed of financial development has 
been rather slow in the transition countries. Foreign-owned banks have 
become major players in the financial system of Central and Eastern-
European countries. However, financial development and foreign bank 
presence vary considerably among the transition economies. Although bank 
assets increased during the 1990s, credit to the private sector remained 
relatively low. Foreign-owned banks lend more to the private sector than 
domestic banks. They have, in general, also higher profitability levels than 
domestic banks. However, it also appears that the performance of foreign 
and domestic banks tend to converge.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. The following section 
points out some basic features of the financial system in the transition 
economies. We focus on the intermediation role of the banking sector in the 
selected transition economies and make a comparison with the euro area. 
Section 2 examines the degree of foreign bank penetration in transition 
economies. Trends in the number of foreign-owned banks and their assets 
will be discussed. This will give us an idea about the importance of their presence. Section 3 analyzes the background and key characteristics of   
foreign-owned banks. Section 4 compares the activities of foreign and 
domestic banks. Section 5 evaluates bank performance in the European 
transition countries, focusing on  profitability and efficiency of domestic 
and foreign banks. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
1.  Intermediation 
 
Figure 1 shows the development of the average assets of deposit money 
banks as a ratio to GDP in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries 
and the euro area, while figure 2 presents figures for individual countries in 
the year 2000. The ratio between banks assets and GDP illustrates the 
importance of the financial services provided by banks relative to the size of 
the economy (Beck et al., 1999). In general, the  average of deposit money 
bank assets to GDP in the euro area is at least twice as high as in the 
transition countries.  
 
Figure 1. Deposit money banks assets and private sector credit in CEE 










1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Deposit money bank assets/GDP in CEE Private credit/ GDP in CEE
private sector credit/ GDP in euro-area Deposit money bank assets/ GDP in euro-area
Source: Central banks of Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and IMF for euro area (excl. Luxembourg). 
 6Figure 2.  Bank claims on the public and the private sector in CEE countries 
and the euro area (% GDP), 2000 
Source: Central Banks and IMF for Bulgaria, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania and euro area. 
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The European transition economies show no uniform pattern of financial 
development. Bank assets in relation to GDP is by far highest in the Czech 
Republic (see figure 2). This is the only European transition economy with 
a financial sector size similar to that of the euro area. In Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia bank assets amount to 
more than 60% of GDP in 2000 and this ratio has been moving upward in 
the recent past. Croatian banks have assets that amount to about 50% of 
GDP. Banking sectors are smallest in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Macedonia and 
Romania. In these countries, this key ratio has even been subject to a 
downward trend. 
  Figures 1 and 2 also present the level of bank claims on the private 
sector as share of GDP. This ratio shows the importance of one of the main 
functions of financial intermediaries, i.e. channeling funds to investors. 
Private credit captures the loans to the private non-financial sector (Beck et 
al., 1999). The difference with total deposit money bank assets mainly 
consists of claims on the government and on (semi-)public enterprises. 
Figure 1 shows that credit to the private sector increased in CEE countries 
but to a lesser extent than total deposit money bank assets. In the euro area, 
 7private credit is about three times as high as public credit, whereas in the 
transition countries private and public credit have about the same size. Still, 
major differences exist between the various CEE countries with respect to 
bank lending to the private sector, as figure 2 illustrates. In the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, and the Slovak Republic the ratio of private sector credit 
to GDP is 40% or higher. In Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia the 
ratio is between 30% and 40%, whereas it is less than 30% in the other 
transition countries. 
Two opposing forces may have influenced extending private credit 
in the transition economies. First, more developed countries generally have 
more developed financial markets (see Khan and Senhadji, 2000). So, one 
would expect that economic development in a transition country will lead to 
more credit to the private sector. Due to relatively underdeveloped equity 
markets in transition economies, firms in need of external funds depend on 
bank credit. Second, due to poor conditions in the banking sector credit to 
the private sector may, however, stagnate. Banks have started to invest 
more in liquid securities such as government bonds (De Haas, 2002).  
 
Figure 3. Private sector credit as share of total credit in CEE countries, 












1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Average credit to the private sector/ total bank credit Standard deviation
Source: Central banks of Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and 
Slovenia. 
 
 8According to De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2002), the reluctance of banks to 
grant new loans to the private sector partly results from lengthy legal 
procedures, especially the inadequate enforcement of creditor rights. 
Indeed, as follows from figure 3, the average  share of credit to the private 
sector as share of total credit in CEE countries hovers around 40-45% in the 
period 1993-2000. The standard deviation of this indicator fell from 25% in 
1993 to around 15% in 2000, suggesting that the CEE countries have 
become more similar in this respect. 
The literature on finance and economic development (see King and 
Levine, 1993a,b; Levine, 1997; Khan and Senhadji, 2000; Levine, Loayza 
and Beck, 2000) suggests that bank activities increases in income. Figure 4 
plots the private credit/GDP ratio and per capita income in eleven transition 
countries for the year 2000. It appears that there is a positive association 
between credit to the private sector and per capita income in the transition 




Figure 4. Private sector bank credit/GDP and per capita income (USD) in 



























Source: Central banks for private credit/GDP (IMF for Bulgaria and Romania) and EBRD for per capita 
income. 
                                                           
2 A simple trend regression confirms this observation. We define GDPPC as per capita GDP and 
PRIVCRG as private credit to GDP. The simple regression result is: PRIVCRG = 16,77 + 0.00329 




This brief overview reveals that the transition economies differ 
substantially with respect to the development of the banking sector. The 
Czech Republic, Croatia, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia have the most 
developed banking systems, while Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Romania lag 
behind. There appears to be a positive association between the level of 
financial and economic development for most countries in the year 2000. 
As far as financial development is concerned, there is a great discrepancy 
between the transition countries and the euro area with respect to the level 
and composition of financial intermediation.  
 
 
2.  Foreign bank presence  
 
The increasing foreign bank presence since the 1990s is one of the most 
striking developments in the banking system in the transition economies. 
We find that, on average, foreign-owned banks account for more than half 
of the total number of banks in 2000 and hold more than two thirds of total 
bank assets in most transition economies. However, the importance of 
foreign banks varies a lot among countries. Still, foreign bank presence in 
all transition countries is considerably higher than in the European Union 
countries, with the exception of Luxembourg (Claessens et al., 2001; Noyer, 
2001).  
Figure 5 illustrates the development of the relative number of 
foreign and domestic banks in CEE countries for the period 1995-2000, 
while Appendix 2.1 gives the absolute number of foreign banks for the 
individual countries. In 1995, 113 foreign banks were present in the 
countries in our sample, accounting for almost 30% of total banks. In 2000, 
their number had risen to 202, accounting for more than 60% of all banks. 
In particular in Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania the number 
of foreign banks grew very strongly. In Latvia, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia the number of foreign banks is in 2000 about the same as in the 
first year of observation.  
 
Figure 5. Number of banks and total bank assets in CEE countries: foreign 












1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Foreign banks Domestic banks Foreign bank assets Domestic bank assets
Source: Foreign and domestic banks: Central banks  of Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia. Relative amount of foreign and 
domestic banks assets: idem minus Romania. 
 
Figure 5 also shows foreign banks assets as a percentage of total 
banks assets in CEE countries, while Appendix 2.2 gives the figures for the 
individual countries. It appears that foreign bank participation increased 
considerably during the second half of the 1990s. At the end of the decade, 
the share of banking assets under foreign control had reached around 64%. 
After several banking crises hit most transition countries in the mid-1990s 
(see Caprio and Klingebiel (2002) for an overview of the different crises), 
bank privatization furthered foreign participation. Initially, most sales 
involved medium-sized banks. Later on, the larger state-owned saving 
banks were sold too. For example, in Estonia, the first foreign-owned bank 
was already established in 1992. But only in 1998 the share of foreign bank 
assets rose to 90%. During the same period, the number of foreign banks as 
share of the total number of banks in Estonia increased from 8% to 50%, 
 11 12
                                                          
reflecting that  the two largest  banks (Hansa Bank and Eesti Uhispank) 
were sold to foreign banks in 1998 (EBRD, 2001).  
 
3.  Foreign bank characteristics 
 
So far, our analysis has been based on aggregated data mainly provided by 
national central banks (see part A of Appendix 1). In order to analyze 
characteristics of individual banks (like the origin of foreign banks and their 
entry strategy) we use the BankScope database (see part B of Appendix 1).
3 
BankScope provides balance sheet data and profit and loss accounts for 
individual banks, adjusting individual bank accounts for differences in 
reporting and accounting standards. Our sample is taken from the 
September 2001 version with data for the period 1991-2000.  
Three problems arise when using BankScope. Firstly, BankScope 
contains banks not being active on the market anymore due to bankruptcy, 
take-over or a merger. Secondly, BankScope does not contain all banks 
active on the market. Thirdly, BankScope does not capture foreign 
branches; this can lead to an underestimation of the level of foreign 
participation.  
These problems differ in weight for the specific countries. To deal 
with these problems and making the BankScope database more reliable and 
useful, the background of every bank has been checked using the 
homepages of the banks or by having email contact with the bank. 
BankScope provides balance sheet data and profit and loss accounts. We 
have added the following information: the year of establishment of the 
bank, whether the bank is foreign or not, the year the bank became foreign, 
whether it was a greenfield investment and, finally, the country of origin of 
 
3 From Appendix 3, it appears that the aggregated data base and the extended BankScope data set are 
quite similar, although some small differences remain, in particular for the Czech and Slovak Republics. 
Part of the difference is due to differences in the definition of a bank. For the aggregated data base we 
use the definition of a bank of Beck et al. (1999). Consequently, the aggregated data base does not 
contain saving banks, cooperative banks, mortgage banks and building societies. The classification 
‘commercial banks’, which is used in BankScope, is not exactly the same.  13
the foreign owner. Furthermore, banks active on the market but not 
recorded in BankScope and foreign branches have been detected and added 
to the database, using the homepages of the specific banks. 
With respect to the characteristics of the foreign banks in the CEE 
countries, we may summarize our findings as follows. The three largest 
banks in each European transition economy are, with a few exceptions, in 
foreign hands. Table 1 gives the nationality of the owner of the largest three 
banks in each country in October 2000. There is a relatively strong presence 
of neighboring countries in some of the European transition economies. For 
example, in the Baltic countries Swedish banks (in most cases Hansabank) 
own the big banks. Austrian banks are well represented in the Slovak 
Republic and Croatia. Many Italian banks have been established in Croatia. 
Banks from non-European countries are almost absent in the transition 
countries, the US-based Citibank and GE Capital being the exceptions. In 
2000 in Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia and Romania the largest bank was still 
owned by the government or it was a local private bank. 
 
Table 1. Ownership of the largest three banks as of October 2000.  
  No. 1   No. 2  No. 3 
       
Estonia  Sweden  Sweden  Finland 
Latvia  Domestic  Sweden  Domestic 
Lithuania  Sweden  Sweden  Domestic 
       
Croatia  State  Italy  Luxembourg 
Romania  State  France    Turkey 
       
Czech Republic  Belgium  Austria  France 
Hungary  Domestic  Belgium  Germany 
Poland  Italy  US  Ireland 
Slovakia  Italy  Austria  Austria 
Slovenia  State  State  France 
Source: BankScope 
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The number of greenfield investments is around 40% of the total number of 
foreign banks. Furthermore, the number of banks with less than 50% 
foreign participation has decreased over time. The most frequently used 
mode of entry of foreign banks is that the foreign bank initially buys a small 
part of a domestic bank. Over time, this share is expanded until a majority 
of the shares is acquired. This approach may be regarded as typical for 
expansion into the transition countries. It contains aspects of a greenfield 
investment and of an acquisition (as the bank regains control over an 
already existing institution). Also, in some countries, buying an existing 
bank means getting around restrictions concerning greenfields. For 
example, in Poland foreign banks were required, in most cases, to take over 
existing troubled Polish banks in order to obtain licenses (EBRD, 1998).  
When a foreign-owned bank buys a domestic bank in a transition 
country, the newly bought bank usually keeps its original name. On 
average, only about 30% of the acquired banks uses the name of the foreign 
acquirer. However, we witness that this practice varies from country to 
country. For example, in Hungary most banks bought by a foreign bank get 
a new name. In Bulgaria, however, banks usually continue to operate under 
their original name.  
 
4.  Activities of domestic versus foreign banks  
 
There are various motives for banks to go abroad and various determinants 
are involved in foreign banking (see Scholtens, 1992). One of the main 
reasons for foreign expansion is that foreign banks follow their customers 
(Goldberg and Saunders, 1991; Brealey and Kaplanis, 1996; Konopielko, 
1999; Buch, 2000; Moshirian, 2001; Green, Murinde and Nikolov, 2002; 
Lensink and Hermes, 2002; Williams 2002). However, Seth,  Nolle and 
Mohanty (1998) find that foreign-owned banks first and foremost lend to 
borrowers other than customers from the home nation. Du (2003) finds that 
foreign subsidiaries of multinational enterprises have incentives to borrow  15
from local, in particular domestic, banks, rather than from the parent’s 
bank. The main reason, according to Du (2003), is that bank co-financing 
with local participation hardens the budget constraint because local banks 
have strength in seizing firm assets in liquidation. Stanley, Roger and 
McManis (1998) mention that foreign banks tend to have high proportions 
of their assets invested in loans to domestic borrowers. Berger, Klapper and 
Udell (2001) and Clarke, Cull and Martinez-Peria (2001) find that foreign 
banks have problems supplying funds to small businesses. Once established 
abroad, foreign banks focus their activities mainly on large enterprises.  
The activities of foreign banks are also dependent on the mode of 
entry. A take-over goes along with the acquisition of the existing client 
base, including its retail banking activities. Along with the greenfield 
investment goes the ability to build up the activities from scratch. The bank 
does not have to cope with the potential of a bad loans portfolio from past 
activities. Regulation may also affect the activities of foreign banks. In 
Slovenia, for example, liberalization of foreign borrowing by residents and 
the abolition of interest rate ceilings on deposits have created a more 
competitive environment, but only since 1999 (EBRD, 2001). Likewise, 
Hungary initially did not permit banks to provide financial and insurance 
services. Changed legislation in 1999 resulted in a movement towards a 
model of universal banking (ECB, 2001).  
We investigate what role foreign banks play in extending credit to 
the private and the public sector in comparison with domestic banks. Figure 
6 shows the development of the average volume of credit to the private and 
public sector as share of total bank credit over the period 1993-2000 both 
by domestic and foreign banks. It is clear that domestic banks have been 
replaced by foreign banks as creditors. In 1993, domestic banks were the 
primary source of credit for the public and the private sector, while in 2000 
foreign banks dominate both markets. Credit to the public sector exceeds 
credit to the private sector for domestic as well as for foreign banks. We 
find that the huge amount of credit to the public sector in the Czech Republic influences the two averages for the foreign banks to a great extent. 
With the Czech Republic not taken into account, credit to the private sector 
by foreign banks would exceed credit to the public sector as from 1998. 
Leaving out the Czech Republic hardly has any effect for the trend in credit 
supply by domestic banks; they still lend primarily to the public sector.  
 
Figure 6. Credit supply of domestic and foreign banks as share (%) of total 








1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Private credit by foreign banks Public credit by foreign banks
Private credit by domestic banks Public credit by domestic banks
Source: Central banks of Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and 
Slovenia. 
 
Figure 7. Credit to the private sector as share of total bank credit: domestic 











ESTONIA HUNGARY LATVIA LITHUANIA POLAND SLOVENIA AVERAGE
Private credit by domestic banks Private credit by foreign banks
Source: Central banks of Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and 
Slovenia. 
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As can be observed from Figure 7, foreign banks in all transition 
countries, except for Slovenia, appear to be more involved with lending to 
the private sector than domestic banks. Still, there are substantial 
differences among the transition countries as to the relative importance of 
private lending by foreign banks. The most extreme case is Estonia, where 
domestic banks hardly provide credit to the private sector.  
 
5.  Performance  
 
According to Claessens et al. (2001), foreign banks are more profitable and 
efficient than domestic banks in developing countries, while in developed 
countries domestic banks are more profitable and efficient than foreign 
banks. These differences can reflect a differential impact of informational 
(dis)advantages, customer bases, bank procedures as well as different 
relevant regulatory and tax regimes. In contrast, DeYoung and Nolle (1996) 
and Berger, DeYoung, Genay and Udell (2000) find that foreign banks are 
less efficient than host nation banks in developed nations. Berger, Dai, 
Ongena and Smith (2003) find that foreign affiliates of multinational firms 
use host nation banks for cash management services. This choice appears to 
affect the geographic scope and size of the chosen bank, the so-called bank 
reach. Furthermore, they find that legal and financial development of the 
host nation affect both bank nationality and bank reach. Focarelli and 
Pozzolo (2001) and Buch and DeLong (2001) analyze cross-border M&A in 
the banking industry. These, in general, appear to be relatively unprofitable 
(see also Berger et al., 2000; DeLong, 2001).  
There are only few studies on the profitability and efficiency of the 
banking sector in the transition economies. Green et al. (2002) estimate the 
efficiency of domestic and foreign banks in Central and Eastern Europe, in 
terms of economies of scale and scope. They find that foreign banks are not 
really different from domestic banks and that bank ownership (foreign 
versus domestic) is not an important factor in reducing bank costs. Kraft  18
                                                          
and Tirtiroglu (1998) have studied X-efficiency and scale-efficiencies for 
both old and new (state and private) banks in Croatia. New banks (i.e. 
foreign banks) are shown to be more X-inefficient and more scale-
inefficient than either old privatized banks or old state banks. However, 
new private banks are highly profitable. According to these authors, this 
abnormal situation has been the result of free-riding opportunities created 
by distressed borrowers, limited competition and start-up difficulties of the 
new banks. Yildirim and Philippatos (2002) find that foreign banks in   
transition countries are more cost efficient but less profit efficient relative to 
domestic banks. Zajc (2002) finds for six European transition countries that 
foreign bank entry reduces net-interest income and profit, and increases 
costs of domestic banks. 
To examine to what extent foreign banks are more efficient and 
profitable in transition countries, we investigate a number of indicators at 
the aggregate level for both foreign and domestic banks: the return on assets 
(ROA), after tax income, net interest margin, and overhead costs.
4 The first 
indicators reflect banks’ profitability, the third indicator signals credit 
market efficiency, and the final one reflects operational efficiency of the 
banks. 
Figure 8 gives the average ROA for foreign and domestic banks
5. It 
appears that the average ROA of foreign banks is higher than the average 
ROA of the domestic banks. The picture is severely affected by bad results 
for domestic banks in 1998 and 1999. In all other years, the ROA of 
domestic banks did not diverge much from that of foreign banks.  
The ROA of foreign banks in Croatia sharply increased since its 
opening up to foreign banks. In Romania and Hungary, the foreign banks’ 
ROA fell in the period under consideration. Estonian domestic banks had a 
 
4 The data about foreign and domestic bank performance in individual countries are available upon 
request. 
5 Unfortunately, we do not have access to reliable information in order to adjust these data for risk. 
  particular bad year in 1998 when their combined ROA was –24%. Without 
Estonian banks, domestic banks’ ROA in transition countries would have 
been –1.5% instead of –4.3%. Figure 8 shows that the ROA of domestic 
banks tends to converge to the average ROA level of foreign banks. The 
general conclusion can be that both for domestic and for foreign banks there 
is an upward trend in ROA, while domestic banks were more sensitive to 
the economic and financial crisis in 1998 (moratorium from the Russian 
debt crisis) than foreign banks.  
 










1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
ROA Foreign banks ROA Domestic Banks
Source: Central banks of Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, the 
Slovak Republic and Slovenia. 
 
The pattern for after tax income of domestic and foreign banks differs 
substantially from that of the aforementioned performance indicator. 
Domestic and foreign banks are subject to contrasting developments in their 
after-tax income (see figure 9). As foreign banks initially experienced a 
decreasing after tax-income, after 1997 their after tax income followed an 
upward trend. Domestic banks however generate lower income every year 
since 1997. Both foreign and domestic banks generate a low after-tax 
income in Croatia and Estonia. In contrast, after tax income is relatively 
high in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia.  
 19Figure 10 reveals that the interest margin of domestic banks is 
higher than that of foreign banks. Interest margin is defined as banks net 
interest income as a share of its total assets. With respect to this 
performance indicator, domestic and foreign banks appear to move closely 
together after 1998, but in 2000, they seem to diverge. The Czech Republic 
witnessed the lowest margins for its domestic banks. Croatia and Estonia 
had, especially during the late 1990s, a high margin, both for their domestic 
and foreign banks.  
 












1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Foreign banks Domestic banks
Source: Central banks of Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia. 
 










1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Foreign banks Domestic banks
Source: Central banks of Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, the Slovak 
Republic. 
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Claessens et al. (2001) and Kraft and Tirtiroglu (1998) conclude 
that foreign banks are more profitable than domestic banks in transition 
economies. Our results broadly confirm these findings, but they also show 
that foreign banks need some time before they outperform domestic banks.  
A stylized fact from the economic literature as referred to above is 
that the costs of foreign banks are lower than those of domestic banks. 
However,  for the transition countries, figure 11 reveals that the differences 
between domestic and foreign banks in the overhead costs as percentage of 
the total assets are rather small. In addition, one can observe the downward 
trend for both domestic and foreign banks. In the Czech Republic, the costs 
of domestic banks are even lower than the costs of most foreign banks in 
other countries. However, the foreign banks in the Czech Republic also 
have a lower cost level than the domestic ones. Estonia and Lithuania show 
a strong decrease in costs of domestic banks during the second part of the 
nineties. According to Lensink and Hermes (2002), the costs of domestic 
banks in developing countries rise with foreign bank entry. We cannot 
confirm their conclusion for the transition economies.  
 
Figure 11. Average non-interest costs of banks in CEE countries: domestic 











1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Foreign banks Domestic banks
Source: Central banks of Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, the Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia. 
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In sum, we find that foreign banks in the transition economies 
generally outperform domestic banks in terms of bank profitability. 
However, we also find that most performance indicators converge in the 
late 1990s.  
 
6.  Concluding comments  
 
Foreign bank entry has been one of the most striking features of the 
development of the banking system in the European transition economies. 
At present, more than half the number of banks in the transition economies 
is foreign-owned and foreign-owned banks possess two thirds of total bank 
assets. This ‘takeover’ occurred within a period of less than ten years. 
However, the speed of financial development has been rather slow in the 
transition countries, in particular the level of credit to the private sector. In 
the early years of transition, foreign banks established representative offices 
and took minority interests in domestic banks. It appears that geographical  
relatedness has been an important factor as far as the choice of the country 
of entry is concerned. From the mid-1990s onwards, foreign banks 
established greenfields and took minority interests in domestic banks. They 
gradually increased these interests and were active buyers of stakes in 
privatized banks. Ultimately, this has resulted in a substantial number of 
majority interests of foreign banks.  
Whether the extensive involvement of foreign banks has been 
beneficial to European transition countries is hard to say. According to our 
analysis up to 2000, the general level of financial development, e.g. the 
level of total claims in the banking system as percentage of GDP, has 
increased only moderately. In addition, the composition of the financial 
structure did not change much: credit supplied to the private sector rose 
only moderately. Foreign banks contributed to this development only in that 
they took over the role as creditor. Although foreign banks lend more to the  23
private sector than domestic banks, public credit of foreign banks exceeds  
private credit.  
We also find that profitability of foreign banks is above that of 
domestic banks. The interest margins of foreign banks are somewhat below 
that of the domestic banks, non-interest income is higher, while overhead 
costs are about the same as that of domestic banks. A convergence with 
respect to the performance of the domestic and the foreign banks can be 
witnessed in the transition countries.  
Finally, the increased participation of foreign banks also gives rise 
to numerous other questions. For instance, how does the transfer of know-
how and technology occur, and what is its impact upon relative 
performance? Is the huge foreign bank presence sustainable and what are 
the implications for financial stability? Which strategies are behind the 
foreign bank penetration into Central and Eastern Europe and when will 
credit to the private sector be on a Western European level? These questions 
may be subject for further research.  24
Appendix 1. Description of the database 
 
The database contains two parts:  
 
Part A:  
Aggregated data on the development, structure and performance of the banking 
systems. 
Source: (a) National Central Banks, and (b) International Financial Statistics of the 
IMF. In case the data conflicted, we opted for those provided by the National 
Central Banks. 
The database includes 15 templates for the period 1990-2000 : 
 
1  Deposit money banks assets as percentage of GDP (a) and (b) 
2  Private credit by deposit money banks as percentage of GDP (a) and (b) 
3  Deposit money bank assets to total financial assets (a) and (b) 
4  Foreign bank assets as percentage of GDP (a) 
5  Private credit by foreign banks as percentage of GDP (a) 
6  Foreign banks assets as share of deposit money banks assets (a) 
7  Number of foreign and domestic banks (a) 
8  Number of foreign subsidiaries (a) 
9  Number of foreign branches (a) 
10  Number of banks with foreign participation (a) 
11  Return on assets (ROA) of foreign and domestic banks (a) 
12  Return on equity (ROE) of foreign and domestic banks (a) 
13  Net interest margin of foreign and domestic banks (a) 
14  Overhead costs as share of total assets of foreign and domestic banks (a) 
15  After tax income (% of total income) of foreign and domestic banks (a) 
 
Definitions: 
 ‘Deposit money banks’ comprises all financial institutions that have ‘liabilities in 
the form of deposits transferable by check or otherwise usable in making payments. 
‘Assets’ refers to total domestic financial intermediation that the respective 
intermediary performs; see Beck et al. (1999), p.4 (IMF definition). 
Assets: see Beck et al. (1999), Appendix, p. 4 (line 22 in IFS).  25
Foreign means: At least 50% of the shares of a bank is foreign owned. 
Foreign participation: more than 5% and less than 50% foreign owned. 
Net interest margin: see Beck et al. (1999). 
Overhead costs: see Beck et al. (1999). 
 
Part B:  
Micro data. Parts of the financial statement and balance sheet of all banks recorded 
in BankScope plus background information of the foreign owner  
Source: (a) BankScope database, and (b) annual report, internet, email contact . 
The database contains 17 variables for the period 1990-2000: 
 
1   Country name (a) 
2   Bank name (a) 
3   Year of establishment (a) 
4   Domestic or foreign owner (b) 
5   Country of origin of foreign main-owner (b) 
6   Greenfield or acquisition (b) 
7   Country rank (a)  
8   Total assets (a) 
9   Total customer loans (a) 
10   Loans to banks (a)  
11   Loans to Municipalities / Government (a)  
12   Return on Average Assets (ROAA) - % (a) 
13   Return on Average Equity (ROAE) - % (a) 
14   Net interest margin (a)  
15   Overheads (a)  
16   Profit before tax (a) 





Appendix 2.1. Number of foreign banks according to central banks.   
 
  1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Croatia   1 5 7 7  13  20 
Czech  Rep.  22  24 24 25 25 28 27 
Estonia   1 1 1 1 3 4 
Hungary  18  18 28 32 32 32 33 
Latvia   12 15 16 16 13 13 
Lithuania  0  0 3 5 5 7 9 
Poland  11  18 25 29 29 39 48 
Romania  12  15 19 23 23 26 29 
Slovak  Rep.  14  18 14 13 10 10 13 
Slovenia  6  6 6 4 3 5 6 
Foreign  banks    113 138 155 163 176 202 
%  of  total  banks    27.9% 34.9% 39.2% 44.8% 50.3% 61.0% 




Appendix 2.2. Foreign banks assets as percentage of total bank assets. 
  1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Croatia    0% 1% 4% 8%  41%  87% 
Czech Rep.  11%  17%  20% 24% 27% 40% 66% 
Estonia    2%  2%  2%  90% 90% 97% 
Hungary  14%  19% 46% 62% 61% 66% 67% 
Latvia    36% 53% 72% 81% 76% 78% 
Lithuania  0% 0%  28% 41% 52% 38% 57% 
Poland  3% 4%  14% 15% 17% 47% 69% 
Slovak  Rep.  12%  19% 23% 30% 30% 31% 43% 
Slovenia  3%  4% 5% 5% 5% 5%  15% 
Average  7.5% 11.2% 21.4% 28.3% 41.2% 48.2% 64.4% 

















Appendix 3. Total banks in CEE countries 
 Bank 










Total :  Total 
according to 
central banks: 
Croatia 42  9  9  1  43  42 
Czech Rep.   27  6  10  10  33  40 
Estonia 9  1  4  1  7 7 
Hungary 29  8  0 1  38 42 
Latvia 28  1  9  1  21  22 
Lithuania 13 1 5 4  13  13 
Poland 50  28  6  3  75  74 
Romania 26  8  4 8  38 41 
Slovak Rep.  20  2  6  2  18  23 
Slovenia 26  4  7 0  23 25 
TOTAL 270  68  60  31  309  329 
Sources: see Appendix 1. 
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